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The seduction industry aims to teach men how to be more successful at attracting women. It is 
global and highly lucrative. The ultimate aims of its clients vary. Some wish to find a partner 
for a long term and monogamous relationship, others simply wish to have sex with as many 
women as possible. A wide variety of products are available to assist in these goals. A range 
of handbooks exist; some are bestselling and a part of mainstream culture. It is not at all unusual 
to see the authors of these books interviewed on daytime or primetime television. One even 
had his own reality television show in which contestants were coached in ‘the art of the pick-
up’ on VH-11. For the more serious aspiring Casanovas, one could attend a seminar, pursue an 
online course, or even sign up for one-to-one ‘in-field training’ from a self-styled ‘Pick-Up 
Artist’ or PUA: Ross Jeffries, discussed below, charges $24,997 for seven days of private 
tuition. 
In such a competitive market and with so much at stake, it is unsurprising that there 
should be a plethora of different approaches to seduction on offer. In addition, each of these 
approaches tackles the issue in minute detail, addressing different parts of social interaction. 
For our purposes, we can divide seduction training into two components.   
The first component might be best described as focusing on what women want. This 
aspect teaches men how to dress, groom, behave and speak in a way that is considered desirable. 
Lists of ice-breakers, or ‘openers’, are provided as a way of approaching women for the first 
time. There are detailed strategies provided for how to deal with common obstacles such as a 
rival suitor or an overprotective friend. There are also step-by-step instructions on how to tell 
if a woman is interested, what to do if she is, and even how to exit with good grace if she is 
not.  
A second component to the seduction industry might be best described as making 
women want. Our focus in this chapter will be this, second, aspect, and how it relates to 
programmed consent. By this we mean ‘consent’ to sexual activity gained through techniques 
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1 The Pick Up Artist (3Ball Productions) was hosted by Erik Von Markovic, aka ‘Mystery’.  It ran for two seasons 
from 2007 to 2008. 
such as neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) and hypnosis. Such techniques have been 
developed (in the context of seduction) and marketed by PUAs such as Ross Jefferies,2 as a 
means to control the sexual desires of women and to program their sexual consent.3 In this way, 
such techniques have the potential to undermine (or at least attempt to undermine) a woman’s 
mental and sexual autonomy.  
  In spite of the prevalence of the seduction industry in mainstream culture, and despite 
the potential gravity of the harms risked, these issues are yet to receive extensive legal attention. 
In this chapter, we analyse techniques of programmed consent over three parts. In Part A we 
discuss attacks on the mind in general terms, exploring the extent to which the law protects 
against mental manipulations. In Part B we focus on the seduction industry, and the detail of 
the claims made about their techniques. Finally, in Part C, we discuss how the current law (in 
the sexual context at least) could be used to protect victims’ mental integrity, whether the 
techniques attempted for programming consent are successful or not.  
  
Part A. Attacks on the mind 
The most well-known (and, arguably, the most serious) subset of sexual offences depend in 
very large part upon demonstrating the non-consent of a victim (V) to sexual activity with (or 
under the control of) a defendant (D).4 The central role of V’s non-consent in such cases has 
been described as a form of ‘moral-magic’,5 transforming the individual and social good of 
consensual sexual activity into a serious criminal wrong.6 However, despite the vital role of 
consent within such offences, the legal problems encountered within its definition and 
application are depressingly familiar. Thus, it is important to place our current discussion of 
programmed consent within this literature.      
 The focus of this chapter, programmed consent, engages with the potential for an 
apparent communication of consent to be deemed legally ineffective. Within the current 
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5 Hurd, ‘The moral magic of consent’ (1996) Legal Theory 121.  
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literature, this has been explored in relation to two main areas. First, we have cases where V 
lacks the capacity to consent because she is unable to make a reasoned decision (eg, due to 
mental illness7). Secondly, we have cases where V has capacity to consent, but her apparent 
consent is invalid because it is the product of fraud or duress.8 Both of these areas have been 
highly contested academically and in the courts.9 However, although there is some overlap 
between our current investigation and both of these areas, the potential for programmed consent 
does not fit neatly into either category: a programmed V may lack capacity to consent, but this 
is not due to any mental illness or naturally occurring infliction; she may have been unduly 
manipulated, but this will not necessarily involve fraud or duress. It is therefore important to 
analyse the legal position of programmed consent on its own merits.  
 
Attacks on the mind and the criminal law 
There has been a long history of extreme claims being made about the power of techniques 
such as NLP, subliminal or non-conscious priming and persuasion, hypnotism, and so on. 
However, in almost every case such claims have been discredited as outright hoaxes and/or by 
failures to replicate their (ostensibly) supportive experimental evidence under controlled 
laboratory conditions.10 Notwithstanding, a lot of money has been spent by people who want 
to believe that techniques of this kind can help them quit smoking or to be more successful in 
their lives. 
The law has shown a clear scepticism whether there is a genuine need for protection in 
this area. There has been civil regulation, but an absence of criminal law.11 However, there 
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computer games under English law’ (1997) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 49.  
have been occasions, particularly in relation to hypnosis, where exaggerated claims have 
triggered a criminal law response. We see this, for example, in the current automatism rules 
where hypnotic suggestion or trance is almost universally included as a paradigm of 
involuntariness, allowing the drone-like subject of hypnosis to avoid liability for any crimes 
committed whilst under the power of the hypnotist.12 The problem here is not the fact of a legal 
response, but rather the isolation of that response to deal exclusively with an exaggerated 
stereotype of hypnosis,13 leading to its lack of use in practice.14 Where a subject is hypnotised, 
but not rendered into a trance, their legal position is uncertain.   
 Criminal law’s scepticism concerning claims about mind intervention and control is 
also shared within the psychology literature. However, crucially, the latter does not adopt the 
all or nothing approach we see in the law. Rather, despite recognising the unreliability of many 
of the more extreme claims,15 and despite difficulties in methodology16 (and ethics17) when it 
comes to testing those claims, there is a general consensus that various mind intervention 
techniques do have an impact upon the practical reasoning of a subject. The content of this 
consensus is rather modest. Subliminal priming can enhance or consolidate wants that are 
already apparent, but does not appear capable of controlling the actions of a subject;18 hypnosis 
shows effects on a subject’s frontal lobe, impacting their capacity to engage in critical thinking, 
but does not lead to uncontrolled movement;19 and so on. Despite their relative modesty, where 
such techniques are employed without the authorisation of V, they still represent a threat to 
individual autonomy, a threat that warrants the attention of the criminal law.  
 Another common theme within the psychology and neuroscience literature is the 
understanding that techniques for mental intervention and control will become increasingly 
effective in the future, and a concern about where this might lead. The refinement of existing 
techniques and/or development of new techniques involving electronic, genetic and/or 
pharmacology induced stimulation of select regions of the brain at cellular or even molecular 
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18 Strahan et al, (n 10) 566.  
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levels holds the potential for much more precise and complete control in the future.20 There has 
also been (and is likely to be) similar progress in the testing used for understanding what type 
and degree of intervention has taken place.21 The progress in psychology in this area (both 
current and future) is often accompanied by concern, precisely because of the lack of legal 
protection. This includes the issue under discussion pertaining to programmed sexual consent, 
but extends to the potential for techniques of mental intervention and control to be used in 
unethical advertising, and even political brainwashing.22 In this way, the case for increased 
protection through the criminal law is even more apparent, and has been acted upon in some 
other jurisdictions.23    
 It has been contended that the criminal law in this jurisdiction should recognise a 
specific right to mental self-determination, and create specific criminal offences to protect it. 
In a wide-ranging paper by Bublitz and Merkel in 2014, the case for offences of this kind is 
made convincingly.24 The authors highlight a range of ways in which mental intervention is 
currently possible and/or is likely to become possible in the future, including the use of various 
drugs (eg, causing hunger or thirst outside a restaurant), subliminal priming, electronic brain 
stimulation, and so on. Stressing the fundamental need for protection, they state: 
Mental self-determination is not just a right granted (or denied) by legal orders. It 
is among the basic assumptions on which liberal legal orders are built.25 
Beyond the general support within their paper for criminalising attacks on the minds of others, 
Bublitz and Merkel also highlight a useful distinction between direct and indirect brain 
intervention. Direct brain interventions are those which bypass V’s thought processes entirely 
and work directly upon the physiology of the brain. Examples of this include the use of mind 
altering drugs, surgical or electronic stimulation of the brain, and so on. Where D directly 
attacks the mind of V in this manner, the case for criminalisation is relatively straightforward: 
although V may not have suffered physical injury, their mental self-determination has been 
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25 ibid 62. 
totally bypassed.26 Direct interventions of this kind are peripheral to the focus of this chapter 
(ie, the methods of programmed consent employed by PUAs), but we would certainly echo 
Bublitz and Merkel’s conclusions that criminal offences should be put in place to protect 
victims from this form of intervention.    
 More relevant to our discussion is the potential criminalisation of indirect (or socially 
reinforced27) interventions. This category includes NLP, subliminal priming and hypnosis.  
Indirect attacks aim to impact V’s thought processes, but without physical or chemical 
intervention on the brain itself. In many ways indirect attacks of this kind are indistinguishable 
from direct attacks: their engagement with V’s critical faculties may be minimal (eg, with V’s 
unconscious mind only), and the outcome impacts upon V may be exactly the same. 28 
Moreover, unless one takes a dualist stance on mind-brain relations, indirect interventions are 
also expected to alter biological processes, blurring the line between direct and indirect 
interventions even further. However, as Bublitz and Merkel highlight,29 the criminalisation of 
indirect mind interventions would require additional elements within the construction of a 
crime. This is because, once we accept that interventions of this kind are not likely to result in 
automatism in V, and once we instead focus on more limited forms of control or manipulation, 
our indirect attack offence risks the criminalisation of ‘legitimate’ forms of manipulation such 
as advertising, and even political or religious discourse. Indeed, any interaction between human 
beings is capable of impacting their future behaviour and choices. Any new offence would 
therefore have to include an additional normative filter, requiring undue or improper 
intervention for example.30         
 
Programmed seduction 
Having discussed mental interventions and criminalisation in general terms, it is now useful to 
focus in upon the subset of attacks most relevant to this chapter: programmed consent. Whilst 
this area is not discussed within Bublitz and Merkel’s paper, we believe that it warrants 
particular attention for three main reasons. First, unlike many of the more theoretical attacks 
discussed above, the seduction industry shows us that men are currently attempting techniques 
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for manipulating and programming consent. We discuss the specifics of this in Part B below. 
Secondly, although psychology literature challenges the stereotype that hypnosis leads to a 
subject’s automatic (entranced) obedience, it does support the idea that such techniques can 
disrupt V’s reasoning processes. Thus, the particular dynamics between a PUA and his so-
called ‘target’, combining hypnosis and other intervention techniques with assertive and 
sexually confident interaction, provides the ideal setting for such techniques to be most 
effective.31 Thirdly, whereas Bublitz and Merkel lament the lack of criminal law protection and 
criticise the criminal law’s focus on body rather than brain, the sexual offences are notable for 
not conforming to this general rule. This final point requires some unpacking.   
 Unlike most other non-fatal offences against the person, sexual offences are not defined 
in relation to physical harms suffered by V. Rather, as we highlighted above, the central wrong 
within offences of rape (section 1, SOA 2003), assault by penetration (section 2, SOA 2003), 
sexual assault (section 3, SOA 2003), and causing a person to engage in sexual activity (section 
4, SOA 2003), is the fact that D’s conduct is not consented to by V. Our focus for these offences, 
therefore, is the mind of the victim. Of course this has not always been true, and older cases 
have tended to conflate questions of non-consent with physical displays of resistance, but the 
focus of the current law on V’s mental state is now clear.32 Consent is defined in section 74 
SOA 2003:   
… a person consents if [s]he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to 
make that choice. 
The focus within this definition on ‘choice’, ‘freedom’, and ‘capacity’, provides a potential for 
legal protection of the mind, a potential that is absent from almost all other areas of criminal 
law.33 Where V’s choice to consent is programmed by another, it is important to ask whether 
such intervention undermines V’s freedom and capacity to choose, even where this control is 
not complete.34   
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The closest we have is an evidential presumption set out in section 75(2)(f) relating to the non-consensual drugging 
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 We return to the discussion of sexual offences and consent in Part C. It is in this part 
that we explore the potential application of these offences to PUAs who attack (or attempt to 
attack) V’s freedom and capacity to choose.    
 
Part B. The seduction industry 
The part of the seduction industry relevant to this chapter suggests that it is possible to 
manipulate (and thus program) a woman’s emotions and desires, through a variety of 
techniques, with the explicit and sole aim that she will ‘want’ to have intercourse with the 
practitioner of these techniques. These aspects are based upon NLP in particular, which is 
heavily influenced by Milton Erickson’s pioneering work in the use of hypnosis in therapy. As 
the name suggests, Neuro-linguisitic programming purports to program (or control) thought 
processes, via speech. It is described as a form of ‘hypnopsychology’, and it was first 
popularized as a means of self-help in the 1970s. NLP claims that it is possible to make a person 
more assertive, confident and better at communication by programming one’s own brain (or 
that of a subject in therapy) to respond in positive ways emotionally to various words.  
When NLP became popularised, industry was quick to pounce. If it is possible to 
program a desired emotional response into one’s audience, there are clear advantages in sales, 
marketing, customer service, and contract negotiation. Even if the term itself has not been used, 
or has largely died out, many leading brands and industries have coached versions of these 
techniques as part of staff training.35 NLP itself is a multi-billion dollar industry, in spite of 
persistent academic and popular scepticism. The NLP academy claims to have trained over 
50,000 people worldwide in these techniques and a core skills diploma can be yours for £1,999. 
So-called ‘life-coaching’ and a plethora of guides and techniques to self-improvement, from 
quitting smoking to conquering phobias, have their roots in NLP.  
The modern seduction industry was born when Ross Jeffries first saw the possibilities 
in NLP for becoming more successful with women. A central idea in seduction techniques that 
are based on NLP is that a man can program ‘any woman’ to wish to have sex with him, simply 
through the power of his voice and words, within ‘twenty minutes or less’ of meeting her.36 It 
                                                          
impacts of the drug rather than its mental impacts, but this is certainly an area that could be usefully reformed in 
the future to increase the protection of V’s freedom to choose. 
35 BMW, Diners Club, American Express and Fiat have each used NLP as part of staff training. 
36 This claim comes from the subtitle in Jefferies Secrets of Speed Seduction (n 2). A huge caveat must be applied; 
the seduction industry is rife with outlandish claims about what various techniques can do. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to address whether NLP actually works.   
is claimed that one can use NLP to bypass the part of a woman’s brain that deals with rational 
decision-making, logic and resistance to suggestion, and directly appeal to the subconscious, 
emotional parts of the brain. One can thereby program the responses that one wishes to elicit. 
It is said that by putting a woman into a ‘trance’ state in this way, ‘[i]nstead of dates that end 
up with a polite peck on the cheek, you’ll end up taking it as far as you want to go, regardless 
of how the woman felt about you before you used these techniques on her’.37 
 
Ross Jeffries and Neuro-Linguistic Programming 
If it really is possible to by-pass conscious decision making on the part of a woman, this sounds 
a lot like by-passing consent itself.  Indeed, in a chapter titled ‘How to use hypnosis to get your 
date into the sack’ Jeffries wrote the following in 1988: 
 
One last caution before I lay out this technology.  In some states, rape is defined as 
“intercourse of a woman, by a man, by force, threat of force, or OTHERWISE 
WITHOUT CONSENT”.  In some states, if you get the date drunk, and fuck her 
while she’s passed out, you could find yourself facing a rape rap.  Likewise for 
hypnosis.  I am not an attorney, and am not giving you legal advice, but I warn you 
here and now of the possible consequences and am not about to be held responsible 
if you get slapped with charges.  YOU USE THESE METHODS AT YOUR OWN 
RISK (And I wouldn’t have to give this disclaimer/warning if these methods did not 
work as well as they do).38 (emphasis in the original)    
 
Later in the same chapter, he talks of how to ‘bypass all of a woman’s conscious resistance to 
screwing you’.39 In the following chapter he opens with the claim that ‘we have all heard the 
nonsense about how “no means no”’.40  
It should be noted at this point that Jeffries has distanced himself from that particular 
publication on the basis that it does not reflect ‘who he is now’. He has even attempted to 
prevent further publication. Jeffries’ personal rejection of this early, slender volume is irrelevant 
to our investigation for two reasons. First, the ‘technology’ referred to, above, is still at the very 
core of his Speed Seduction® technique, which he continues to teach and which has spawned 
hundreds of imitators. He has no qualms with using testimonials as to the successful application 
of his earlier work in order to promote later publications. The more recently published Secrets 
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of Speed Seduction® Mastery contains a watered down, more vague disclaimer at the start for 
any actions by those that have learned this method.41 Jeffries’ recantation appears to be limited 
to some of the coarse vocabulary used; he no longer refers to himself as ‘the guru of gash’ and 
his website encourages ‘respect for yourself and the women you enjoy’, though there remains 
plenty of unfortunate language when one delves deeper. 42  Secondly, and much more 
importantly, we are not targeting Jeffries individually. Jeffries is ‘the undisputed father of 
modern seduction’.43 Many have earned more money or become more famous, but no Pick-Up 
Artist has been anything like as influential. The self-published How To Get The Women You 
Desire Into Bed has been referred to as the Bible of the seduction industry. Every modern course 
in the industry borrows at least some of these techniques and our concern is with this element 
of the broader industry, rather than a witch-hunt of its pioneer.  
 Not all NLP-based aspects of the seduction industry are part of our investigation.  Much 
of this approach focuses on self-improvement in order to portray confidence, communicate 
more effectively and overcome common anxieties involved in approaching women or asking 
someone out on a date. Instead we will focus on those techniques that are said to use hypnosis 
as a means of by-passing conscious decision-making and generating sexual arousal. In this 
regard, there are three key steps. These are likely to each be used more than once in the course 
of a ‘seduction’, and their order might vary depending on the circumstances. In what follows 
we provide the basics, while trying to avoid some of the nuances and more complicated jargon. 
 
1. Eliciting the preferred representational system 
A fundamental notion in NLP is that we each have different ‘maps’ for understanding and 
experiencing the ‘terrain’ of the real world that we encounter. Each person’s map is different, 
but we each have a preferred representational system. Some prefer to experience and remember 
things visually, some orally, some aurally and others kinetically (through touch). In NLP-based 
seduction techniques, it is vital to identify the preferred representational system of the woman 
in question, in order to unlock her sub-conscious mind. One way of doing this is to engage the 
woman in a conversation about some pleasant, ideally ‘exciting’, memory. Jeffries claimed at 
one point that ‘nine times out of ten’, if you ask a woman to tell you about something exciting 
that has happened to her and use the correct tone of voice, the story will be an erotic one. This 
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43 Neil Strauss The Game: Penetrating the Secret Society of Pick Up Artists (Regan Books, New York, 2005) 38. 
claim may seem dubious, but it need not be true. Something as simple and innocuous as an 
enjoyable vacation would work. As the woman recounts this story, her preferred 
representational system should become clear, but the man should ask questions that will help 
in its discovery. So if a woman describes a beach holiday, for example, the man should ask 
questions about which feelings or sensations she particularly enjoyed. If she responds by talking 
about the feeling of warmth on her skin and the sand beneath her feet, her preferred 
representational system is kinetic. On the other hand, if she talks about the sight of sunshine 
glistening on the ocean and clear blue sky, her preferred system is visual. If she responds by 
talking about the sound of the swash and backwash of the ocean, it is aural, and so on. More 
daringly and more directly, one might even enter into a conversation about how the woman has 
felt in the past when she met a boyfriend for the first time or when she looks at a movie star 
upon whom she has a crush, and to key into how she expresses those feelings.   
 
2. Patterns 
Eliciting the preferred representation system will take place early on in the conversation, while 
the woman is talking. When the man talks he must use a number of ‘patterns’. This may happen 
before, after, or preferably both before and after the preferred system has been determined. The 
purpose of a pattern is to induce a trance like state in the woman, via specifically designed 
storytelling. It is important that this is done subliminally. A cardinal rule for Jeffries is that one 
must never tell a woman that one is capable of inducing such a state. Instead of talking about 
oneself, it is better to present the story (i.e. pattern) as though recounting something that has 
happened to a friend or that one has read or seen on television. In this way, it is said, one can 
bypass the parts of the mind that generate suspicion and resistance. The normal guards are 
lowered if the story is at a distance, so one might introduce it as something that happened to 
‘my friend, Tim’ or in a television documentary that one has seen. The story should be very 
sensually rich so as to arouse a sensory response in the woman. It should also involve various, 
subliminal words that are really little more than double-entendres, but appear perfectly innocent 
in context.  
A favourite of Jeffries (and through his influence, PUAs worldwide) is ‘The Discovery 
Channel Pattern’. This involves claiming that one has seen a documentary on what makes the 
ideal rollercoaster ride at funfair attractions. As a pattern, it affords the opportunity to the man 
to talk in rich, sensual terms, perhaps with the knowledge in advance of the woman’s preferred 
representational system. So if the woman is kinetic, one can emphasize the feeling of 
anticipation and excitement aroused when one feels the rollercoaster in its ascent, the sense of 
wild abandon when it reaches its climax, and the rush as it speeds onwards to more and more 
fun later on. If the story is told well, with the correct use of the voice, the woman will be 
emotionally transported to those sensations; she will actually imagine being on a rollercoaster 
and the feelings that it evokes. It also allows one to mention terms like ‘attraction’, ‘feeling’, 
‘excitement’, ‘arousal’, ‘climax’ and even ‘getting off’, in an apparently innocent context. 
While the conscious mind might have put up resistance to discussion of such things in a sexual 
context during a conversation with a recent acquaintance, it will not do so in a discussion of 
rollercoasters. The subconscious mind, Jeffries and others suggest, will still make the 
connection. So even if the woman is only conscious of idle, relaxed chit-chat, the notion of 
sexual intercourse has been planted into her subconscious mind. The idea is that she is already 
being sexually aroused without knowing it. 
 
3. Anchoring 
During steps one and two, the man should use ‘anchoring’.  An ‘anchor’ is some physical 
marker, which is introduced during the creation of a desired response in the woman. These 
anchors are to be repeated throughout the conversation. So if the man were to rub his chin, 
during the sensual parts of the story when a woman is (unwittingly) revealing her 
representational system, he should perform the same gesture, at the relevant time, during the 
various patterns that he uses over the course of their conversation. If a trance state is correctly 
induced, the woman will experience the same sensual pleasure as she remembered in her story 
and imagined in his, any time the gesture is used thereafter. So by simply rubbing his chin, the 
man can put the woman in this aroused state at his will. 
 
Once these three steps have been followed, there is a wide variety of ways to proceed to 
intercourse using this mind-manipulation. Space prohibits a full explanation of the various other 
techniques that can be employed. These include methods to get around ‘last minute resistance’ 
by ‘freezing out’ a woman who refuses sex, thus associating negative emotions with that refusal. 
It also includes subliminal ‘command words’. One could link the rollercoaster story to arousal 
by saying something innocuous such as ‘when you are really attracted to someone, you feel the 
same way’; the idea being that the subconscious will hear the command ‘feel the same way’ 
and thereby respond with a flood of those sensations and emotions. This even extends to using 
deliberate mispronunciation to issue a command – a crude, but well known example from 
Jefferies is to use what appears to be the phrase ‘below me’, but actually issue the command 
‘blow me’. In a trance state, it is claimed, the unconscious mind will make the woman respond 
to this command.44 
All of the literature, online courses and youtube seminars in this area are, of course, 
directed squarely at men. There are thus virtually no accounts of these interactions from the 
perspective of a woman who has been manipulated into sexual intercourse in these ways. It 
seems clear, however, that the woman in question will not feel so ‘out of it’ as to be unaware 
of what is happening or unable to remember the incident; this system does not produce a 
dissociative state. Popular stereotypes about hypnosis, highlighted in Part A, do not apply here; 
the woman in question does not stare at a pendulum then ‘do her master’s bidding’. Instead, the 
notion is that these techniques will enable a man to implant the desire to have sex with him into 
the mind of a woman. As Jeffries puts it, ‘whatever you can get a woman to imagine for herself, 
is going to be perceived as her own thought...you are throwing your own thoughts into her 
head’.45 The woman’s conscious mind will feel that she has made a deliberate decision, while 
in fact the man has programmed her to have that desire in the first place, and then programmed 
and commanded her to act on it.   
 
Part C. Legal responses to programmed seduction 
Having discussed the potential for legal protection against unauthorised mental interventions 
in general, and having discussed a particular set of techniques within the seduction industry, 
this Part of the chapter brings the two areas together. It is here that we discuss the potential 
application of the law on sexual offences. In doing so, we split our discussion between two 
potential avenues. First, we explore the potential for liability where the techniques of the PUA 
work as intended, where D gains ‘consent’ through mental manipulation and programming. 
Secondly, we explore the potential for liability where these techniques are not successful, or 
where their impact on V cannot be proven.  
 
Successfully programmed consent    
Where D successfully gains ‘consent’ to sexual activity through the use of techniques such as 
those discussed in Part B, we ask whether this consent is legally valid, and whether D should 
                                                          
44 For a good, eye-witness account of Jefferies successfully using these techniques, see Strauss The Game (n 43) 
45-47.   
45 Jefferies Secrets of Speed Seduction (n 2) 16. 
be liable for sexual offences under sections 1-4 SOA 2003. There are two questions of consent 
within these offences. First, we must ask if the successfully manipulated V is consenting in fact 
(part of the actus reus of the offences). Secondly, we must ask if it is possible in these 
circumstances for D to have a reasonable belief that V is consenting (part of the mens rea of 
the offences). We explore each in turn.   
On the first question (ie, whether V consents), it is important that we focus on the mind 
of V and the wording of section 74 SOA 2003: does D’s successful mind intervention 
undermine V’s ‘freedom’ and/or ‘capacity’ to ‘choose’ to engage in sexual activity? The 
answer, we contend, is yes. This is because freedom to choose, at its minimum, must include 
the uncontrolled use of one’s practical reasoning. Genuine choices about sexual consent will 
include a variety of factors (eg, pleasure, financial gain, family, etc), and some of these may 
influence V to make unwise decisions that she might later regret, but at least this is a choice 
that she has made. Where V’s mental processes are compromised to even a limited (but 
appreciable) extent, and where such compromise was not authorised by V, we are not dealing 
with choices that V has made. Interestingly, even those writers advocating that hypnotised 
movement should be described as action (ie, not automatic) have still expressed support for 
this more limited position. We see this in William’s example of Cesare, a fictional character 
who is mentally controlled by Dr Caligari and used by him to commit murder:46    
… suppose Caligari had said, "You agree to do it?" and Cesare, in his 
somnambulistic state, had said "Yes, I agree to do it." Cesare would not have 
actually agreed to do it: that is not an act that in this state he can perform. The 
explanation is to be found in his dissociation from considerations that essentially 
bear on his doing so. In this state, he cannot summon up, for instance, thoughts that 
would relate the killing to the rest of his life.47 
Of course, the ultimate question about the validity of V’s consent (as with Cesare’s intention 
to kill) will have to consider the degree of D’s intervention; the more minor the intervention, 
the more responsible V will be for her choices. Thus, if we consider the techniques summarised 
in Part B, the relevant question is not the number of ‘patterns’ or ‘anchors’ used, but rather the 
impact of these on the mind of V. Inevitably, this becomes a question of fact for a jury.   
                                                          
46 Williams, ‘The actus reus of Dr Caligari’ (1994) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1661. The example is 
taken from Robert Wiene's 1919 film The Cabinet of Dr Caligari.  
47 ibid 1671.  
 The second mens rea question is more straightforward. This is partly because of the 
extremely wide drafting of the relevant provisions in the SOA 2003 on mens rea as to consent, 
requiring only for D to have lacked an objectively reasonable belief that V was consenting.48 
In this way, even where D believes that V was consenting (ie, where he believed that she 
expressed a free and competent choice to consent), D will not avoid liability unless that belief 
was reasonably held. Where D’s deliberate aim is to program (or at least disrupt the normal 
mental processing) of V’s mind, then his aim is in direct opposition to V’s ability to make a 
free and competent choice to consent. There is clearly such a deliberate aim (to programme V) 
on the part of anyone employing the highly specific NLP-based seduction techniques discussed 
in Part B. Thus, D is very unlikely to believe that V is consenting in the relevant way, and even 
where he claims to have had such a belief, that belief could scarcely be described as a 
reasonable one. 
 Having established the likelihood for D to have committed a sexual offence in these 
circumstances, it is also appropriate to consider associative liability. Our question here is 
whether those teaching and/or publicising these techniques within the seduction industry may 
be prosecuted for the same offences as D, but as secondary parties?49 The answer in most cases, 
again, is surely yes. Complicity liability does not require the aider or abettor (X) to have had a 
significant or causal impact on the actions of D. Rather, it is sufficient for X to have provided 
some assistance or encouragement, for that conduct to have been intentional, and for X to have 
at least foreseen the chance that D might go on to complete the relevant offence.50 Crucially, 
this last element does not require X to recognise that D’s conduct will amount to a sexual 
offence (ignorance of the law is no excuse). It merely requires that X had foreseen that D might 
employ the techniques, and that they might impact V’s consent. Where promoters and PUA 
authors are making money from teaching about these techniques, one would assume that they 
at least foresee the chance that they might work. As noted in Part B, we even see explicit 
awareness of this via the use of disclaimers of liability. Of course, such disclaimers have no 
legal force.    
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 Set out in these terms, the case for liability under the current law appears to be a strong 
one. However, it is useful to highlight two factors that will potentially make prosecutions 
problematic. Both relate to the question of whether V’s consent is legally effective.  
The first potential problem originates in the psychology literature, and the claim within 
certain studies that hypnosis cannot cause (or even influence) people to act against their will. 
In a series of studies by Coe, Kobayashi and Howard for example,51 hypnotised and non-
hypnotised participants were asked to sell heroin as a favour for the lead investigator (not 
knowing that the request was part of the study). The study found that hypnotism had no effect 
on a participant’s willingness to engage in the illegal conduct (ie, could not cause participants 
to act against their will), with the study even showing a slightly increased acceptance among 
the non-hypnotised group.52 Similar doubts have also been raised as to NLP and subliminal 
persuasion.53 If the techniques discussed in Part B could be shown to have no scientific basis 
whatsoever, then clearly those techniques will not have undermined V’s consent. As discussed 
in Part A, it is likely that such techniques will be developed further in the future, and effects 
may (at that stage) be found,54 but the current psychology literature remains problematic for 
prosecution purposes.     
The second and related problem, also emanating from psychology, relates to the 
difficulty of measuring the effects of techniques such as NLP and hypnosis. Even where 
individuals are hypnotised under controlled conditions, different behavioural or 
neurophysiological measures designed to assess a subject’s level and state of consciousness are 
not entirely reliable, and can often yield contradictory findings.55 In the context of a criminal 
trial, which examines past (non-clinical) events, the lack of a reliable measure will be 
particularly troublesome. This is because the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that D successfully manipulated and/or programmed V’s consent on the specific previous 
encounter. This problem is exacerbated in the context of the scenarios outlined in Part B. 
Patterns are deliberately constructed so as to take the form of normal social interaction. Even 
evidence of standard pattern use will not be conclusive of their impact on V’s mind. These 
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53 Pratkanis & Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (1992).  
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55 Seth et al, ‘Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches’ (2008) Trends 
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problems may be overcome (or at least mitigated) over time as our ability to measure the effects 
of hypnosis and NLP improves. Currently it provides a significant obstacle to prosecution.  
The problems identified in the previous paragraphs do not justify or mitigate the actions 
of men within the PUA community who attempt to use techniques such as NLP and hypnosis 
to undermine the sexual choices of women. Therefore, although they represent obstacles to 
prosecution, the case for criminal law intervention remains a strong one. With this in mind, a 
more promising route to prosecution may lie within the inchoate offences: offences which focus 
on the criminal ambitions of D, as opposed to the impacts of their conduct. Bublitz and Merkel 
have also highlighted this in relation to potential general offences of mental manipulation.56    
 
Attempted programmed consent 
In addition to the substantive sexual offences discussed above (sections 1-4 SOA 2003), each 
offence can also be committed in an inchoate form. Inchoate offences, such as attempt,57 may 
be particularly useful in this context. Where D’s efforts to program the consent of V are 
unsuccessful, attempts liability provides one of the only routes to potential liability. And even 
where D’s efforts are successful, charging D with an attempt offence avoids the problems of 
proof highlighted at the end of the last section. Essentially, attempts liability focuses on (and 
blames) D’s conduct in trying to program the consent of V, avoiding psychologically 
controversial questions about the impacts of that attempt on V’s mind. In other words, if D 
were to go through the steps outlined in Part B, culminating in a subliminal ‘command’ for V 
to sleep with him, D could still be liable even if V is unaffected (or the effects on V cannot be 
proved).     
 So does D commit an attempted sexual offence when he tries to program V’s consent? 
First, to satisfy the actus reus, it must be proven that D’s conduct went beyond mere preparation 
towards the commission of the substantive offence,58 or did so on the facts as D believed them 
to be.59 In this regard, it might be argued that a conversation between D and V would not be 
sufficiently proximate to the forms of sexual activity proscribed within the substantive offences 
to be ‘more than merely preparatory’. Eliciting a preferred referential system, delivering a 
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pattern and even anchoring do not necessarily involve any sexual activity.  Indeed, patterns are 
often designed to appear entirely innocuous and devoid of sexual content.  This argument, 
however, does not work. There is a strong line of precedent in relation to sexual offences which 
allows for attempts liability from the moment of confrontation.60 For example, this would be 
the case where D physically restrains V prior to sexual contact. As noted in Part A, attacks on 
the mind should be treated no differently. D physically confronts and restrains V in order to 
prevent resistance. D runs patterns, anchors and programs V in order to prevent resistance. 
Indeed, ‘overcoming’ various forms of ‘resistance’, in the form of conscious decision-making, 
are recurring themes in the literature. D’s conduct satisfies the actus reus of attempt through 
confrontation by way of attack on V’s mind. Of course, in a case in which sexual activity ensues, 
the requirement of moving beyond mere preparation is clearly satisfied.61  
The next question is whether, at the moment of confrontation, D has gone beyond mere 
preparation towards non-consensual sexual activity. This need not, however, lead us back to 
the problems of proof discussed in the previous section. Rather, even if D’s attempts at NLP 
and/or hypnosis will have no impact on V’s mind, as long as D intends and/or believes that 
they will, his conduct will satisfy the actus reus on the facts as he believes them to be (ie, as an 
impossible attempt). Thus, as long as D performs the sort of techniques discussed in Part B, 
and does so in the belief that these techniques have some prospect of success, the actus reus of 
the attempt offence will be satisfied.    
 Beyond the conduct requirements for attempts liability, D must also hold the required 
mens rea. This is satisfied where D acts with the intention to complete the relevant sexual 
activity (ie, within sections 1-4 SOA 2003), and intends/knows that V will not consent to that 
activity.62 Where D is using techniques of NLP and/or hypnosis to seduce V, an intention to 
gain sexual contact is likely to be straightforward to prove. Demonstrating intention or 
knowledge as to V’s non-consent should also be relatively easy. V’s consent requires freedom 
and capacity to choose. D is specifically aiming to by-pass conscious decision-making in order 
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to program V to make the choices that he desires. On this basis, D must (in law63) be intending 
to undermine V’s consent. Attempts liability appears to be satisfied.          
 Aside from those who put these techniques into practice (D), issues arise relating to 
those who teach, promote or publicise these techniques (X). In relation to such individuals, in 
cases where D is not straightforwardly liable for a substantive offence, the most appropriate 
charge would be inchoate assisting or encouraging under section 46 of the Serious Crime Act 
2007 (SCA 2007). This offence does not require D to have committed a substantive sexual 
offence, or even to have completed an attempt. In this sense, X’s liability here does not rely on 
the conduct of D at all, unlike complicity liability discussed in the previous section.  
The actus reus of section 46 SCA 2007 requires X to have completed an act capable of 
assisting or encouraging D to commit one or more offences (ie, in this case, one or more sexual 
offences).64 The drafting here casts the net of liability very widely. X’s act need not assist or 
encourage D in fact, as long as it is capable of doing so: thus, there is no need to show that 
anyone was actually influenced by X. Equally, there is no need to tie X’s conduct to the 
assistance or encouragement of any one offence: as long as X’s conduct is capable of assisting 
or encouraging one of a number of sexual offences (eg, sections 1-4 SOA 2003), the actus reus 
is satisfied. In terms of mens rea, X must believe that his conduct will assist or encourage D to 
complete the act element of one or more of the substantive offences (ie, believe that his conduct 
will assist or encourage D to engage in sexual activity with V);65 X must believe that D will 
complete the act element of one or more of the substantive offences (ie, believe that D will 
engage in sexual activity with V);66 and X must be at least reckless as to whether D, when 
engaging in that sexual activity, will do so without V’s consent and with the mens rea required 
for liability.67  Although section 46 is (overly) complex in its construction, none of these 
elements would appear problematic for a prosecution to prove in the current context. 68 
Ironically, Ross Jeffries’ attempts to avoid liability may have the converse effect: his 
disclaimers demonstrate sufficient belief and appreciation of each element listed.         
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 For those people making money from advertising and teaching PUA techniques such 
as NLP and hypnosis, there are very few routes available for avoiding liability under section 
46 SCA 2007. One option for X would be to deny that techniques such as NLP and hypnosis 
are capable of having any impact on V’s mind (ability to choose freely) whatsoever. This could 
be presented as a denial of actus reus (ie, X does not assist or encourage non-consensual sexual 
activity because the techniques discussed do not facilitate such activity), or as a denial of mens 
rea (ie, X is not even reckless as to D acting in the absence of V’s consent because X does not 
foresee the possibility of the techniques working). Such denials would be problematic for X. 
Particularly where X is making money on the basis that he or she is teaching or advertising 
valid techniques, public denial that the techniques work and that X ever believed that they 
could work would be very bad for business. Indeed, such a denial could potentially lead to 
liability for fraud by (previous) false representation. The only other option open to X would be 
to rely on the defence of ‘acting reasonably’ set out in section 50 SCA 2007. However, this 
defence would require X to convince a jury that helping or encouraging men to program the 
sexual consent of women is reasonable. This would be (and should be) extremely difficult.       
 
Conclusion 
The criminal law generally should pay more attention to the potential for mental as well as 
physical attacks against the person. The potential for mental interventions and manipulations, 
both direct and indirect, are present dangers, and ones that are only likely to increase over time. 
Thus, it is important to have criminal law protection in place to protect victim’s mental integrity 
as the science develops.  
 Nevertheless, as this chapter demonstrates, the law is already well equipped to protect 
the mental integrity of the potential victims of sexual offences. Crucially, this protection 
extends to attacks that use NLP and hypnosis. A host of further important issues are now raised. 
Prominent among these is the question of enforcement. Even if the criminal law is capable of 
finding liability in this area, should this be taken forward by public prosecution? We believe 
that it should, though a full exploration of this issue is not possible in the current chapter. Where 
the wrong of a criminal offence is located in a defendant’s willingness to use another person 
against their will, and where the law is designed to protect a victim’s right and freedom to 
choose, we believe that all conduct engaging this wrong should be treated equally. The law on 
sexual offences has already made great strides in this regard over the last few decades. Just as 
the law has come to dismiss rape myths and to recognise that non-violent submission still falls 
short of positive consent, the full (and practically enforced) protection of a victim’s mind 
cannot (and should not) be far away.   
 Equally importantly, we have also set out the potential for prosecution of defendants 
who assist or encourage others to attempt such techniques. Whether this prosecution takes the 
form of complicity or inchoate assisting or encouraging, there is a clear case to be made that 
these activities are criminally wrongful. Taken at its very best, this limb of the seduction 
industry is simply a lie to make men more confident when talking to women, making genuine 
consent more likely. However, even here, teaching men that confidence comes through 
attempted manipulation that removes choice from woman is dangerous, and its promulgation 
should be carefully managed.  
If we take sexual offences seriously as violations of sexual autonomy as opposed to the 
simple infliction of harm, then mental manipulations (or attempts at such manipulations) are 
just as serious as physical manipulations. This is not the time to be sentimental about traditional 
ideas of seduction and masculinity. Techniques such as NLP and hypnosis are not displays of 
charm; they are attacks on mental and sexual integrity.  
